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Abstract 
The Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011 generated a series of large tsunami waves. The tsunami waves reached area deep 
within the units at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The station blackout and loss of all instrumentation and control systems at 
reactor 1-4 at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant caused the loss of control and cooling means of three reactor units that were 
operational up to the time of the earthquake. These three reactor cores were heated up due to reactor decay heating. Severe damage of the 
fuel and a series of explosions occurred. The explosions of unit 1 and 3 at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant have been investigated 
using image processing. The explosion of unit 1 is a typical gas explosion with the following steam release from the reactor container 
vessel. It seems that the destruction of the reactor building of unit 3 initiated by the major leakage from the reactor container vessel or gas 
explosion and following massive release of internal fluid accelerated the structural destruction. The ejected flammable gas burned as a 
counter flow flame on the roof of the reactor building of unit 3. 
© 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Asia-Oceania Association for Fire Science 
and Technology. 
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Nomenclature 
t time after explosion (s)  
H height from ground level (m) 
A1 estimated surface area of upper structure of reactor building (m2) 
V1 estimated volume of combustible mixture burned (m3) 
l   characteristic length (m) 
characteristic time (s) 
1. Introduction  
The Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011 generated a series of large tsunami waves. The earthquake and 
tsunami waves caused wide spread devastation across a large part of Japan. 
Several nuclear power plants were firstly affected by the sever ground motions and the operating units at these plants 
were shut down by automatic systems. These plants were secondly affected by the large tsunami waves. The tsunami waves 
reached area deep within the units at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The station blackout and loss of all 
instrumentation and control systems at reactor 1-4 at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant caused the loss of control and 
cooling means of three reactor units that were operational up to the time of the earthquake. These three reactor cores were 
heated up due to reactor decay heating. Severe damage of the fuel and a series of explosions occurred [1].  
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A local TV station, Fukushima Central Television installed a telephoto camera system at a hill 10 km from Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear power plant. The installed camera recorded the explosion of the unit 1 on March 13, 2011 and that of the 
unit 3 on March 14, 2011. The installed camera also operated to record the events on March 15, 2011 when the unit 4 
exploded but the fields were covered in morning mist. The TV network that controls the copyright of the video tape of the 
explosions of unit 1 and 3, Nippon news network provided the author two digital files of these explosions for detailed 
investigation.  
Considering the characteristic velocity of gas explosion phenomena, the use normal video rate movie for analytical 
investigation of gas explosion phenomena is not acceptable for laboratory scale experiments. The characteristic velocity, l/  
the ratio of the characteristic length, l and time,  of the explosion accidents of nuclear reactors are estimated to be of order 
of 104 m/s for the characteristic length of 400 m and the video rate of 3.3 × 10-2 s.  
Explosion destroyed nuclear reactor building which is a containment of reactor core. Debris and radioactive materials 
were scattered over the plant. Four people were injured during the explosion of unit 1 and eleven people were also injured 
during the explosion of unit 3[2]. Wind transported the released radioactive materials.  
A reactor building is equipped with a tall exhaust tower to maintain the lower internal pressure and higher dilution of 
discharged materials. Gas explosion transported radioactive materials released during the explosions of units 1 and 3 to 
higher altitude and diluted in the wind stream while radioactive materials from unit 2 were released directly from the reactor 
building near the ground and the observed radiation level at the plant gate was much higher than those of units 1 and 3 
explosions.  
Two explosions of nuclear reactor buildings illustrated the processes of radioactive material release and dispersion and it 
is important to verify the effectiveness of the current accident management against explosion hazards. 
In this paper, the explosions of unit 1 and 3 at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant have been investigated with image 
processing. 
1.1. Image data 
The recorded images were supplied as high quality movie files. The frame rate of the movies was 30 frames / second. 
Two movies were converted into two series of color images. A set of programs processed these images. 
The vertical pixel size was estimated from the heights of exhaust tower and reactor building. The horizontal pixel size 
was assumed to be equal to the vertical one.  
The heights of exhaust tower and reactor building are 120 m and 60 m, respectively from the ground level of Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear power plant, 10 m above sea level. The vertical difference between the tops of exhaust tower and reactor 
building is 79 pixels. The estimated pixel size is 0.76 m/pixel. 
1.2. Analysis 
Each series of color images of explosion was processed to generate an x-t diagram to examine the vertical movement of 
debris and gas. The centerline of the reactor building was sampled from each color image and compiled a x-t diagram. 
2. Unit 1 explosion 
Two frames of color image recorded flame on the reactor building of unit 1, the following series of color images also 
recorded debris and gas movements. The vertical velocities of debris and gas were determined from the x-t diagram in 
vertical direction. Based on the obtained x-t diagram, detailed flame and gas movements have been examined.  
2.1. x-t diagram in vertical direction 
Figure 1 shows an x-t diagram in vertical direction of unit 1 explosion along the center of the reactor building. t in this 
figure is time after flame appearance. Centerline from H = 0 to 480 m of the reactor building of unit 1 was sampled from t = 
− 1 s to 19 s.  
Water condensation is seen as a strait white line from t = 0.13 s to 0.33 s. 
The roof debris is also seen from t = 0.5 s to 4 s. The peak of this trajectory occurred at t = 2.3 s at H = 86 m. 
White streak, stream line 1 appears after t = 1 s at H = 40 m and becomes brighter at t = 5 s. Another wide white streak, 
stream line 2 appears after t = 3.5 s at H = 50 m. 
The merged streaks separates lower and upper clouds after t = 10 s with the maximum height H = 120 m.  
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Fig. 1. x-t diagram in vertical direction of unit 1 explosion along the center of the reactor building.  
2.2. Detailed flame observation 
The reactor building of unit 2 on the recorded image covered part of the reactor building of unit 1 as shown in N3, N4, 
and N5 of Fig. 2. N5 of Fig. 2 shows detailed flame images of unit 1 explosion. As south wall of unit 1 is partly covered 
with unit 2, two lines indicate the horizontal location of unit 1 and two dotted lines show that of unit 2 in N5 of Fig. 2. A 
tower stands in front of unit 1 as a black vertical line.  
Flame appears on the upper part of the west and south wall of unit 1 and not above the reactor building of unit 1 in N5 of 
Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2. Detailed flame images of unit 1 explosion. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Extended x-t diagram from t= − 0.8 s to 0.8 s. Fig. 4. Flame movement during explosion.  
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2.3. Water condensation propagation velocity 
Water condensation after flame appearance was examined in detail. An extended x-t diagram from t = − 0.8 s to 0.8 s is 
shown in Fig. 3. This figure shows water condensation in six frames. A straight line connects the upper rim of water 
condensation. The propagation velocity is 273 m/s. 
2.4. Flame movement during explosion 
Presuming that the flame located at the roof of the reactor building at t = 0 in N5, upper rim of flame in two pictures of 
unit 1 from t = − 33 ms to 100 ms in N6 and N7 were connected with a straight line as shown in Fig. 4. Flame appears above 
the reactor building of unit 1 in N6 of Fig. 4. White cloud appears above the reactor building in N7 and N8. 
The gradient of this line 150 m/s in vertical direction shows that the flame propagation velocity is much larger than that 
of deflagration but smaller than that of detonation.  
3. Unit 3 explosion 
Flame on the reactor building of unit 3 was recorded on fourteen frames of color image. Debris and gas movements were 
also recorded.  
3.1. x-t diagram in vertical direction 
Figure 5 shows an x-t diagram of unit 3 explosion. Centerline from H = 0 m to 400 m of unit 3 was sampled from t = − 1 
s to 19 s.   
Flame is seen from t = 0 to 0.43 s. The upper edge of the flame reaches its maximum height, H = 77 m at t = 0.1 s and 
lowers. The lower edge of the flame reaches its minimum height, H = 55 m at t = 0.2 s, rises. Four steam lines 1, 2, 3, and 4 
are seen between H = 40 m and 60 m. These steam lines form the lower cloud after t = 8 s. The stream line 2 descends from 
t = 0.5 s to 2 s.  
Black cloud is seen above the flame after t = 0.2 s. This cloud rises to H = 400 m at t = 19 s. Two groups of falling debris 
are seen after t = 8 s. The lower cloud from t = 9 s to 12 is covered with one of these groups. The other group is seen from t 
= 9 s to 12 s. The peaks of these two groups of debris trajectory, H = 240 m and 210 m occurs around t = 7 s and 5 s 
respectively. Deformation of the lower cloud occurs from t = 12 s to 14 s when the falling fragments land on the reactor 
building.  
Rising dust is seen from H = 300 m to 400 m after t = 14 s. Upper cloud at H = 120 m and lower cloud from H = 40 m to 
100 m are seen after t = 14 s. 
 
Fig. 5. x-t diagram of unit 3 explosion.  
3.2. Detailed flame observation 
Detailed flame images of unit 3 from t = − 67 ms to 0 are shown in M2, M3, and M4 of Fig. 6.  
Frame is horizontally divided into seven areas, R1, S1, R2, R3, S2, R4, and R5 in this figure. Area R1, south wall of unit 
2, area S1 ,space between unit 2 and unit 3, area R2, west wall of unit 3, area R3, south wall of unit 3, area S2, space 
between unit 3 and unit 4, area R4 ,west wall of unit 4, and area R5,south wall of unit 4 are shown in this figure. 
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Flame appears at right side of area R3 and left side of area S2 between H = 58 m and 75 m at t = 0 in M4 of Fig. 6. 
Comparing frames, M2 and M4 of t = − 67 ms and 0 in this figure, a dark part is seen at left side of area S1 and area R2 
between H = 45 m and 65 m and no change is seen at the similar area of unit 4, area R4 between H = 45 m and 60 m. 
A black line is seen at right side of area S1 of H = 60 m at t = 0. This black line is clearly seen at areas R2 and R3 of H = 
60 m at t = − 33 ms. The width of this black line increases at the center of area R3 at t = − 33 ms. 
A bright line is also seen at right side of area R3 of H = 70 m at t = − 33 ms. Ejecting flow is seen at the boundary 
between areas R3 and S2 from H = 45 m to 60 m at t = − 33 ms. 
 
Fig. 6. Detailed flame images of unit 3.  
3.3. Fluid movement around unit 3 
Figure 7 shows Fluid movement around unit 3 from t = − 0.1 s to 0.5 s. Dark shadow on the south wall of unit 2 is 
moving to the left side of the wall as seen in frames, M7, M10, M13, M16, and M19. Triangle dark shadow appears between 
H = 45 m and 60 m in frame M19 at t = 0.5 s. The estimated velocity of this white line is 20 m/s. 
 
Fig. 7. Fluid movement around unit 3 from t = − 0.1 s to 0.5 s.  
4. Results and discussion 
4.1. Explosion of the reactor building of unit 1 
Based on the recorded events of the explosion of unit 1, Fig. 8 shows schematically velocities of water condensation 
(white area) propagation, asphalt roof, flame, and moving fluid.  
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Invisible expansion wave seems to travel ahead of the water condensation. The internal fluid seems to expand uniformly 
at the velocity between 110 m/s and 150 m/s from unit 1. The expanding fluid was burning in this rapidly expanding flow 
field for short duration. Considering this short duration of burning of 0.067 s, the flame propagation length is 0.2 m with the 
maximum burning velocity, 3 m/s of hydrogen-air mixture.  
Assuming that the flame propagated normal to the external walls and the estimated surface area, A1 of the upper structure, 
60 m x 60 m is 3600 m2, the estimated volume, V1 of combustible mixture burned during this period is 720 m3. The ratio of 
the estimated volume V1 to the total volume of the upper structure, 72000 m3 is 0.01. Assuming the burned gas expand 8 
times in volume, the expected over pressure is 8 kPa. The over pressure estimated from the fragment velocity of the asphalt 
roof is 27 kPa [3]. Based on this estimation, 78 % volume of the formed mixture has burned before the structural destruction.  
The explosion of unit 1 is a typical gas explosion with the following steam release from the reactor container vessel. 
 
Fig. 8. Schematic of explosion of unit 1. 
4.2. Explosion of the reactor building of unit 3 
Figure 9 shows velocity of moving fluid around unit 3 of t < 0.1 s, schematically.  
 
Fig. 9. Schematic of explosion of unit 3. 
Fluid is spreading from the corner of the reactor building at 150 m/s after t = 0. The velocities of these fluids are the 
order of the velocity of the expanding fluid from unit 1. The fluid spread rate in horizontal direction reaches 20 m/s after t = 
0.2 s as shown in Fig. 7.  
Dark cloud and steam appeared in an accident of titanium water/oxygen/hydrogen/ploytetrafluoroethylene reaction under 
40 MPa [4]. Dark fluid ejecting in the accident of titanium reaction was a metal oxide water mixture [5]. Black cloud may 
be some metal oxide water mixture that appeared in metal-water reaction. 
The walls of unit 3 seems to be falling in areas R2 and R3 from H = 45 m and 60 m between t = − 33 ms and 0. Fluid is 
ejecting from unit 3 to the right side of area R3 at 300 m/s at t = − 33 ms. This ejection of fluid occurs at the southeast 
corner of the reactor building of unit 3. 
A flame is stabilized at the southeast corner of unit 3 for 0.43 s which is ten times longer than that of unit 1. 
Considering the flow field around unit 3, Fig. 10 shows a model of the observed flame. The direction of the ejecting fluid 
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changes at t = 0.43 s during black cloud rising above unit 3. For t < 0.43 s, a counter flow flame may be stabilized near the 
stagnation plain between the ejecting fluid and incoming air.  
It is seen that the destruction of the reactor building initiates by the major leakage from the reactor container or gas 
explosion and following massive release of internal fluid accelerates the structural destruction of unit 3. The ejected 
flammable gas may burn as a counter flow flame on the roof of the reactor building.  
 
Fig. 10. A model of the observed flame of unit 3. 
5. Conclusions  
Explosion of nuclear reactor container vessel has been considered the worst consequence of a nuclear reactor accident. 
The recorded two cases are not explosion of nuclear reactor container vessel that occurs with accumulated hydrogen-oxygen 
mixture by radiolysis. Hydrogen-air mixture formed in the reactor building caused the recorded explosions. The explosions 
destroyed the building structures and internal equipments. Large amount of internal fluid and solid spreads to the 
environment.  
The destruction of the reactor building occurs within a few seconds and the release of internal fluid and solid continues 
more than 10 minutes.  
 Landing of blown debris occurs from 10 to 14 s after explosion in unit 3 case. Landing of blown debris can cause 
additional structural damage.  
The released water vapor condensates and spreads along the ground. The dispersion of released material is much slower 
than that of released from exhaust tower. Even under a severe accident, the controlled release of overheated fluid from 
exhaust tower is the way to reduce the effect of radioactive materials at the ground level.  
If uncontrolled release of overheated fluid occurs from a reactor building, dense white cloud covered the reactor building 
like the cases of unit 1 and 3. 
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